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United States defence expenditures: 
trends and analysis 1 
Robert E. Looney and Stephen L. Mehay 
Introduction 
Either by formal treaty, presidential declaration or executive agreement 
the US is committed to provide military support to more than 40 nations 
throughout the world. Probably no other barometer of US capabilities in 
fulfilling those commitments is so closely watched as the level of its 
spending on defence. This is true even though it is debatable whether 
measures of input are superior to measures of output, such as readiness or 
performance, in gauging a nation's broad defence capabilities. The impor-
tance of defence expenditures as an overall indicator of military capability 
is highlighted by events of the last decade. An apparent gap in spending 
between the USSR and the US in the 1960s and 1970s prompted a rapid 
acceleration of US military spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The pattern of defence spending in the US since 1948 reveals a steady 
upward trend in real outlays. Real military purchases (in 1982 dollars) rose 
$2 billion per year on average between 1948 and 1986 (Higgs 1988: 16). 
However, this steady upward trend has been punctuated by three periods 
of rapid multi-year build-ups of real military outlays -1950-3, 1965-8, and 
1978-85. All of these mobilization periods have been followed by substan-
tial reductions in real military outlays. For example, the congressional 
authorization of $300 billion for fiscal year 1989 represents 11 per cent less 
in real terms than spending in the peak year of 1985, and 1 per cent less 
than the previous year .2 
As a result of the complexity of forces underlying the US budgetary 
process, single theories have not been particularly accurate in either 
accounting for past spending patterns, or in providing insights to future 
allocations. At least nine factors have been advanced at one time or 
another to account for defence spending patterns (Schneider 1988: 54): 
1 international events 
2 changing administrations 
3 public opinion 
4 congressional attitudes 
'he economics of defence spending 
domestic economic constraints 
perceptions of the Soviet threat 
arms control agreements 
elections 
inter-service rivalries 
'o this list we might add such factors as expenditures by allies, burden 
~aring among alliance members, and macro-economic stabilization con-
iderations. Clearly, several of these explanations overlap, and they are 
kely to have had varying strengths and operated in conjunction with 
issimilar sets of forces during the various sub-periods outlined above. In 
ddition, the feedback effects from economic performance to future levels 
f defence expenditures are complex and not well understood. 
None the less, all of these threads - domestic budget and political 
onsiderations, relationships between allies and external threats - are 
roven into the final decision on the amount of defence spending. The 
1urpose of this chapter is to develop a model of the relationships between a 
1ation's observed level of defence spending and its economic performance, 
lomestic political status and external spillovers. The chapter starts by 
eviewing past economic performance of the US economy and how past 
efence choices have been influenced by economic and strategic con-
itions. Second, it examines the current position of the economy, recent 
conomic policy developments and forecasts for future growth. Third, it 
,ighlights trends in defence spending and discusses current defence policies 
nd trade-offs. 
A secondary purpose of this chapter is to estimate a military expenditure 
emand function for the US using time series data. Accordingly, it assesses 
:ie importance of various factors that have been proposed as explanations 
f defence spending patterns, and then briefly reviews previous models of 
efence spending from the economics literature. Much of this literature ~as 
oncentrated primarily on examining the interactions between spendmg 
~vels of alliance members, principally NA TO (Murdoch and Sandler 
984). Although economic models of defence spending are used as a guide 
:> appropriate specification of an expenditure demand function for the US, 
le main goal of the chapter is not to estimate spillover effects between the 
JS and its allies. Instead, the demand function is specified in an attempt to 
ssess the relative importance of the causal factors in the list above. This 
ection also tests the model of the demand for military expenditures, and 
.iscusses the empirical results. Finally, the chapter presents concluding 
emarks and an appraisal of future directions of US defence spending. 
'ast performance of the US economy 
US defence expenditures 
one level, military planners mostly ignore economics when devising 
strategies and determining appropriate force requirements. Ideally, foreign 
policy objectives are established first, then a military strategy and force 
structure are designed to meet those objectives. The cost of this force 
structure determines the defence budget, at which point the economic 
environment and budget priorities enter the picture (Olvey et al. 1984). In 
reality, this ideal sequence is often completely reversed, as in the recent 
Gramm-Rudman era. In this sequence, economic constraints and budget-
ary ceilings dictate the acceptable force-structure options. The alternative 
selected is the one that best meets the foreign policy objectives. 
Regardl<fss of the process whereby foreign policy objectives ~nd military 
programmes are aligned, ultimately a nation's current real mcome and 
future economic growth set important constraints on the fulfilment of basic 
military strategies - 'in some measure, military power reflects economic 
power' (US Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy 1988: 6). 
These basic economic parameters not only determine a nation's ability to 
meet its military requirements but also establish the opportunity costs of 
doing so. During wartime, of course, nations must mobilize a significant 
share of the nation's scarce resources for military activities. Both the US in 
1944 and Iraq in 1986 devoted over 41 per cent of GNP to military 
purchases. But even during peacetime strategic choices vary tremendously. 
Although estimates of Soviet defence spending vary considerably (Becker 
1986), by most accounts the Soviet defence burden (as a per cent of GNP) 
is between 15 and 17 per cent, at least three times larger than the defence 
burden of the US. Other extremes in defence burdens include poor nations 
that devote a high portion of their GNP to the military (North Korea, 23 
per cent; Syria, 22 per cent; Libya, 18 per cent) and wealthy nations that 
devote a low share to the military (Japan, 1 per cent; Austria, 1.3 per 
cent). 
Although wide variations in the share of GNP devoted to defence are 
observed, over time sustained economic growth is necessary to maintain a 
high level of defence effort. A slowdown in aggregate economic growth 
constrains the growth of national defence expenditures because the burden 
of defence spending increases. In a slow- or no-growth environment, the 
implicit cost of increasing the share of defence expenditures, in terms of 
foregone capital formation and civilian production, increases sharply. 
The relationship between economic growth and defence efforts is 
underscored by recent events in the Soviet Union. The most reliable data 
on Soviet military expenditures (compiled by the CIA) indicate that the 
growth rate of Soviet defence outlays began to decrease after 1977. A 
major cause of this slowdown was a pronounced slowdown in the growth of 
the Soviet economy (Brada and Graves 1988). The slowdown in economic 
. ,. -· . . .. . . 
·he economics of defence spending 
·able 2.1 Performance of the US economy 
'ear Growth Unemployment Inflation rattl' Federal deficit 
rate (%)8 rate(%) ($bn) 
960 2.2 5.5 1.5 0.3 
965 5.8 4.5 1.9 -1.4 
970 -0.3 4.9 5.5 -2.8 
975 -1.3 8.5 7.0 -53.2 
980 -0.2 7.1 12.4 -73.8 
982 -2.5 9.7 3.9 -127.9 
984 6.8 7.5 4.0 -185.3 
985 3.0 7.2 3.8 -212.3 
986 2.9 7.0 1.1 -221.2 
987 2.9 6.2 4.4 -150.4 
988 2.4P 5.4° na -146.7'1 
>ource: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of President, Feb. 1988 
Votes:• Percentage change in real GNP, 1982 $. 
' Percentage change in all items of CPI. 
Annual rate for March, 1988. 
' Preliminary forecast. 














·eluctant to do. Thus, the real rate of growth of defence - especially 
Jrocurement - was cut drastically {Ofer 1987). 
Economic growth plays an equally important role in constraining US 
Jefence efforts. Statistical indicators of the performance of the US 
economy since 1960 are displayed in Table 2.1. The most notable feature of 
the economic landscape in the early 1980s was the recession in 1981-3. A 
trough was reached in 1982 when the unemployment rate peaked at 9.7 per 
~ent, and the economy registered a 2.5 per cent decline in real GNP. Since 
1982, however, economic growth has been robust, exceeding that of most 
Jther industrialized western nations. By July 1988 the economy had 
!Xperienced 69 months of economic expansion, and the unemployment 
rate had reduced to 5.4 per cent, a level many economists believe 
represents the natural rate of unemployment. 3 The annual growth rate of 
real GNP averaged 3.8 per cent between 1982 and 1987, exceeding the 
~rowth rates of West Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France but falling 
;lightly below that of Japan.4 As Table 2.2 indicates US growth also 
Jutpaced the Soviet economy. 
There is considerable debate over the precise causes of the continuous 
expansion of the economy in the last 5 to 6 years. 5 Some economists 
11ttribute the expansion to standard demand-side (Keynesian) economic 
policies, whereas others trace the expansion to the supply-side policies 
instituted by the Reagan Administration. The supply-side stimulus was 
;purred principally by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which 
reduced the maximum tax bracket from 70 per cent to 50 per cent and cut 
; .. ,.,.,. ........ .,..,,,.., hv <>hn11t ?':!. nPr rPnt nvPr thP ":\ vPa1"!1. fnllnwino 1QR1 
US defence expenditures 
Table 2.2 Relative annual growth rates 
Period us European Community 
1966-708 3.0 4.6 
1971-758 2.2 2.9 
1976-808 3.4 3.0 
1982 -2.5 0.8 
1984 6.8 2.4 
1986 2.9 2.6 
1987 2.9 2.3 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, Feb. 1988 









expenditures also were introduced into the law. The tax cut clearly 
stimulated investment spending, which contributed to the economic 
growth record. 
However, the rapid growth also can be traced in part to substantial 
increases in federal government spending. In real terms total spending 
grew by 30 per cent from 1980 to 1987. The federal tax cuts of 1981 were 
put in place at roughly the same time that a major buildup in defence 
spending was launched. 
A major concern for the economy has been the federal deficits incurred 
during this period. Because the anticipated supply-side boost to productive 
activity from the tax cut was not as great as expected, tax revenues fell 
short of expectations, producing unprecedented peacetime budget deficits. 
Until 1982 deficits typically represented less than 1 per cent of GNP; since 
1982 the federal deficit has averaged 4.6 per cent of GNP. As Table 2.1 
shows, federal deficits grew from $73bn in 1980 to a peak of $22lbn in 
1986, representing about 5 per cent of GNP and 18 per cent of federal 
government expenditures. The accumulated debt has caused considerable 
controversy in the US, including calls for a constitutional amendment 
requiring a balanced budget. More important was passage of the Emergency 
Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of 1985 that mandated 
automatic spending cuts if progress was not made towards eliminating the 
budget deficit by 1991. 
Regardless of the stimulative effect of deficit spending, there are 
numerous other macro-economic consequences of the large federal deficit. 
The low rate of saving since 1982 is explained in part by the high rate of 
government dissaving, and has been blamed in part for holding down 
capital formation and long-term economic growth. In addition, the budget 
deficit appears to carry some of the blame for a growing external deficit. 
Payment of interest and dividends abroad increased the current account 
deficit to a record $125bn in 1986. The federal deficit also may have acted 
as a brake on the recovery of labour productivity (output per manhour). 
he economics of defence spending 
1ith GNP growth. When labour productivi~y in the business sector of the 
conomy was growing briskly between 1948 and 1973 by 2.8 per cent per 
ear, real GNP growth averaged 3.7 per cent annually. However, when 
ibour productivity growth fell to only 0.7 per cent annually from 1973 to 
981, the growth rate of real GNP also dropped to only 2.2 per cent. Some 
nprovement has been achieved in labour productivity since 1981, with an 
nnual growth rate of 1.2 per cent between 1981 and 1986 (Council of 
~conomic Advisers 1987), but this remains an important question for the 
Jture.6 
lecent policy developments and prospects 
~fter the stock market crash of October 1987 the US economy appeared to 
,e teetering between the potential for recession on the one hand and 
enewed fears of inflation on the other. However, consumer and investor 
onfidence recovered quickly and the index of leading indicators has 
onsistently pointed toward continued expansion. Recession fears have 
bbed and the economy is projected to grow at roughly 2. 75 per cent 
nnually in 1988 and 1989.7 Mid-term projections show the economy 
rowing at 3.3 per cent annually for the 1989-93 period, a rate which is in 
ne with the post-war average. Indeed, some analysts are predicting the 
ost-1982 economic expansion may last for several more years.8 
Par! of the strength of the economy is .derived from continued improve-
1ent m real net exports. The dollar has depreciated sharply since March 
g85 leading to a 17 per cent increase in exports of goods and services in 
g87. Indeed, for the first time since 1980, the contribution to growth of 
~al net exports has become positive. In part the need for additional 
apacity will stem from export demand. Business fixed investment rose 3.7 
er cent in 1987 after a precipitous decline in 1986, and it is forecast to rise 
.4 per cent in 1988. 
Despite the recent depreciation of the dollar and the fall in unemploy-
1ent, inflation has not accelerated. With productivity growth in manu-
1cturing averaging 3.5 per cent per annum, unit labour costs have fallen 
lmost continuously since 1982. The outlook for inflation is good but 
llarded. Whereas the inflation rate is expected to increase slightly from 3 
er cent in late 1987 to 4.5 per cent in late 1989, numerous factors could 
1ange that picture rather quickly. 
A major policy debate that has surfaced in the US, which has national 
efence implications, concerns the causes of the reduced competitiveness 
f US products in world markets. Some analysts argue that the current 
;onomic expansion and improvement in exports are due solely to the 
~predation of the dollar. They feel that the underlying structural causes 
f the competitive weakness of US goods abroad have not improved. A 
US defence expenditures 
part of this problem is that compared to, say, Japan, the US invests far less 
in civilian R & D. 
Other analysts have argued that conditions have improved in American 
manufacturing and they forecast further improvements in industrial 
competitiveness. They cite healthy improvements in labour productivity, 
R & D spending, and investment-to-output ratios. They also cite improve-
ments in product quality control by American manufacturers and the 
recent restraint in wage demands and increases.9 
Support for the latter group is provided by several long-term forecasts of 
positive US productivity growth. The personal saving rate (as a percentage 
of disposable income) increased somewhat in 1987 to 5 per cent from its 
near-reoor~ low of 3 per cent in mid-1987, and it is forecast to improve 
further in 1988. Other factors cited for these rosy forecasts are: (a) 
increases in the age and, therefore, experience of the US labour force; (b) 
recent declines in energy prices; and (c) increased expenditures on R & D. 
However, it should be noted that some offsetting factors are at work. 
Whereas the 1986 Tax Reform Act further lowered the maximum marginal 
tax rate from 50 per cent to 33 per cent, incentives for investment also were 
reduced. The Act increased the tax rate on nominal capital gains, 
eliminated the investment tax credit, and eliminated the generous treat-
ment of depreciation expenses. Thus, gains in productivity stemming from 
improvements in saving and investment remain a question mark for the 
economy. 
The federal deficit is projected to remain around $150bn for fiscal 1988 
and 1989. This implies a neutral fiscal stance and places major reliance on 
monetary policy to stabilize economic fluctuations. It is also noteworthy 
that, as a percentage of GNP, the US budget deficit is either less than or 
about the same as that of Italy, Canada and France, and only slightly 
exceeds that of West Germany. Moreover, the federal government deficit 
is in part offset by the surpluses consistently run by state and local 
governments ($57bn in 1986) and the significant surpluses building up in 
the social security fund, which are expected to grow from $20bn in 1987 to 
$46bn in 1989 and to nearly $100bn by 1993. 
In summary, economic influences on defence spending will come from 
two sources - one positive and one negative. The pressure to slow federal 
spending to meet the deficit-cutting guidelines in Gramm-Rudman will 
likely translate into no real growth of defence spending, and possibly real 
cuts through at least 1991. The positive effect will stem from continued 
growth of the economy, which will likely buoy federal tax revenues and 
lessen the need for deeper cuts. Of course, factoring in changes in 
international events and domestic political events, such as the change in 
administration in 1989, muddies the water but probably does not alter the 
basic directions determined by economic considerations. 
ie economics of defence spending 
rade-offs and choices in defence spending 
ecent defence policies in the US highlight the interaction between 
:onomic constraints and defence strategies. After the Soviet invasion of 
fghanistan in 1979, President Carter announced in 1980 that any attempt 
, gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be considered an assault 
1 the vital interests of the US. Thus, the Carter Doctrine, as it came to be 
1own, imposed a new obligation on US conventional forces already 
rained to meet existing commitments in Europe and the Far East. Thus, 
1e legacy of the Carter Administration was a huge gap between military 
>ligations and the resources necessary to meet the new requirements 
tecord 1984). 
The Reagan Administration pursued a miljtary strategy that emphasized 
e ability of the US to wage war simultaneously on several fronts, a 
incept that was implicit in the Carter Doctrine. The Administration also 
ilS committed to expanding and modernizing conventional forces in order 
implement this strategy in reality as well as on paper. Thus, Reagan 
1dertook to finance the obligations implied by the multi-front strategy 
.th major sustained real increases in defence spending. In 1981 the 
eagan Administration embraced the goal of the US Navy, established as 
1rly as 1974, of the 600-ship fleet, including 15 carrier battlegroups, 100 
tack submarines and the amphibious lift capability for four Marine 
igades. In 1986 the Navy introduced 'The Maritime Strategy', the 
1jectives of which are, in the event of war, to exert global pressure on 
1viet naval forces and to strike targets in Soviet home waters and on the 
1viet mainland (Watkins 1986). Although the objectives of 'The Maritime 
rategy' provide the foundation for the 600-ship fleet, they have been the 
bject of intense debate and scrutiny (Kaufmann 1987). 
The figures in Table 2.3 represent the evolution of US defence expendi-
res by major mission over the last decade. Following adoption of the 
arter Doctrine and the multi-front strategy by the Reagan Administration 
e share of the defence budget devoted to conventional forces expanded 
nsiderably, from 32 per cent in 1975 to 42.4 per cent in 1985. This 
;rease in conventional forces also reflects the outlays necessary to 
~et the buildup to the 600-ship navy. Note, too, that some increase in 
e percentage of the budget devoted to nuclear forces has occurred as 
e Reagan Administration has sought mo~ernization of these weapons 
stems. 
The main missions that appear to have suffered under the recent 
fence buildup are 'Training, Medical and Other Personnel Activities', 
d 'Support of Other Nations'. It is noteworthy that the Guard and 
!serve Forces have grown proportionately to the overall growth in 
fence spending in line with adoption of the Total Force Concept 













US defence expenditures 
Table 2.3 DOD expenditures by mission - 1975--85 (total spending, $bn, and 
percentage distribution) 
Summary by programme 1975 1980 1985 
($) (%) ($) (%) ($} (%) 
Strategic forces 7.2 8.25 11.1 7.8 27.8 9.8 
General purpose forces 28.1 32.0 52.2 36.6 120.6 42.4 
Intelligence and communications 6.3 7.2 9.1 6.4 25.1 8.8 
Airlift and sealift 0.9 1.0 2.1 1.5 7.0 2.4 
Guard and reserve forces 4.8 5.5 7.9 5.5 15.7 5.5 
Research and development 7.7 8.7 11.9 8.3 24.6 8.6 
Central supply and maintenance 9.1 10.3 16.0 11.2 24.4 8.5 
Training, medical and other 
general personnel activities 20.0 22.8 29.2 20.5 33.1 11.6 
Administration and associated 
activities 2.0 2.3 2.5 1.7 5.9 2.1 
Support of other nations 1.8 2.0 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 
Total 87.9 100.0 142.6 100.0 284.7 100.0 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of US Government, various years 
conventional force strategies, and that role is programmed to expand in the 
future. 
Defence versus social programmes 
There are numerous ways to represent the relative burden of defence 
spending on an economy, and the social opportunity cost of defence. In 
this section military spending is measured as purchases of newly produced 
goods and services, a component of the National Income and Product 
Table 2.4 Shares of GNP (per cent) 
Year Government- Government- Privatec 
militaO-- non--militar/' 
1950 5.0 8.5 86.5 
1960 8.8 10.7 80.5 
1965 7.2 12.4 80.4 
1970 7.6 13.9 78.5 
1975 5.6 15.4 79.0 
1980 5.2 14.2 80.6 
1982 6.1 14.1 79.8 
1983 6.3 13.5 80.2 
1984 6.2 13.2 80.6 
1985 6.5 13.9 79.6 
1986 6.6 13.9 79.5 
1987 6.6 14.0 79.4 
Sources: Higgs (1988); Economic Report of Presid8flt, Feb. 1988 
Notes:• Military purchases as percentage of GNP. 
b Total government (all levels) purchases as percentage of GNP. 
•Sum of consumption, investment, plus net eKports as percentage of GNP. 
1 economics of defence spending 
:ounts, rather than the budgetary outlays of the Defense Department. to 
>le 2.4 divides GNP into three exhaustive· categories - military pur-
ses, other government purchases (by all levels of government), and the 
.dual all-private purchases. Private purchases are composed of the sum 
:onsumption, investment, and net export spending. 
fiewed in this light, since 1950 the military share of GNP reached a peak 
LS per cent in 1960 and declined for the next 20 years to a low of 5.2 per 
.t in 1980. The share grew after 1980 stabilizing at 6.6 per cent. It is not 
u whether non-defence programmes and the private sector, or both, 
d to grow at the expense of defence. The government non-military 
re grew steadily until 1975, and has fallen slightly since. Conversely, the 
~ate share of GNP declined until 1960, where it has remained essentially 
1stant. 
-liggs (1988) investigated this issue further and concluded that in the 
~8-86 period the government non-military share of GNP gained at the 
>ense of both the military and private share. However, his analysis 
>wed that 'changes' in the military share were almost exactly offset by 
posite changes in the private share. A one percentage point 'increase' in 
: military share of GNP was offset by a one percentage point 'decrease' 
the private sector share. A partial explanation for this tendency is 
>vided in Table 2.5, which computes the percentage of federal expendi-
es accounted for by defence and by federal transfer payments. In 1966, 
fence purchases were almost 43 per cent of total outlays; by 1980 they 
d fallen to only 23 per cent. Conversely, transfer payments had risen 
m 23 per cent of federal expenditures in 1966 to over 40 per cent in 1980. 
us, defence programmes and transfer programmes have reversed their 
ative positions in the federal budget. 
)le 2.5 Shares of Federal Government spending 
If Federal expenditures Defence purchases Federal transfer -
($bn) (%) payments to individuals(%) 
i6 145.3 42.6 23.0 
'O 207.8 36.9 29.6 
'5 364.2 24.6 40.3 
10 615.1 23.2 40.2 
12 781.2 24.8 40.4 
14 895.6 26.1 38.4 
15 984.6 26.3 37.2 
16 1,032.0 26.9 37.3 
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Current defence policies 
Recent policy initiatives have proceeded along two fronts - one political, 
the other technological. Diplomatic efforts have produced the Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which eliminates missiles in western Europe 
with ranges between 300 and 3,000 miles. Negotiations are also proceeding 
on START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), the goal of which is large 
reductions in the superpowers' nuclear forces. At the Reykjavik summit in 
1986 Gorbachev offered a 50 per cent cutback in nuclear weapons 
contingent upon the US stopping research on the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI). 
SDI is the technological direction that has been pursued actively by the 
Reagan Administration since 1983. The defensive system seeks to develop 
both ground-based and space-based interceptors that would destroy attack-
ing missiles immediately after launch, rather than just before the warheads 
strike their targets. In 1987 DOD approved a plan to fund six specific 
projects to be operational by the mid-1990s and built at a cost of $250bn 
over the entire period (Heppenheimer 1988). This would produce a 
defensive force, known as Phase I, with the capability of destroying about 
one-fourth of attacking Soviet missiles. The advantage of Phase I is that it 
would strengthen deterrence by increasing the uncertainty of the success of 
a Soviet first-strike. If just one quarter of Soviet missiles can be destroyed, 
the Soviets must consider the possibility that sufficient US missiles will 
survive the first strike and be launched in retaliation to destroy consider-
able Soviet targets. 
It is clear that the technological (SDI) and diplomatic initiatives are 
complementary. By proceeding with SDI development the US will be in a 
better position to negotiate treaties on new missile systems (e.g. fast-burn 
rocket boosters) that offer no military advantages to either side once 
Phase I is in place. Indeed, the current improved climate of superpower 
relations may be traced in part to American insistence upon continued 
funding of SDI. 
The administration's plans, however, have been forced to yield to 
domestic budget and political realities. Although Congress authorized 
$4bn to be spent on SDI in fiscal year 1989 it revealed a strong scepticism of 
the more exotic space-based interceptors, reducing the allocation to such 
systems to a meagre $85m for fiscal year 1989. Congress continues to push 
ground-based interceptors, and allocated $350m for such systems in 1989.11 
In October 1988 the Defense Department acceded to these political and 
fiscal pressures by reducing the proposed number of space-based inter-
ceptors by one-half, and stretching out completion of the first phase of SDI 
to the late 1990s. 
Similarly, the Reagan Administration requested $800m for the multiple-
---- -L---11 
he economics of defence spending 
lidgetman. The Democratic-controlled Congress allotted $250m to each 
1d set aside another $250m for the incoming aaministration to allocate as 
wishes. President Reagan vetoed the entire defence authorization bill in 
ugust 1988 and was able to reach some compromises with Congress in the 
i1al bill. None the less, the future of SDI and the different offensive 
•stems will be influenced by the party that wins the presidency in 
>89. Whereas the Republicans favour the MX and Midgetman offensive 
'Stems and SDI, the Democrats oppose all three systems. 
The successful negotiation of the INF treaty with the USSR to reduce 
1ort- and medium-range nuclear missiles in Central Europe presents some 
:awbacks as well as obvious benefits. As the number of nuclear weapons 
~Id by each side drops, the US and its NATO allies will be forced to turn 
1eir attention to conventional weapons. Unfortunately, as Table 2.6 
1ows, the Warsaw Pact nations maintain a substanti~l superiority in 
Ible 2.6 NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional forces, 1987 
Atlantic to Urals8 Global 
NATO WP NATO WP 
rmpower (000) 
:tive ground forces 2,385 2,292 2,992 2,829 
~serve ground forces 4,371 4,276 5,502 5,348 
'OUnd force equipment 
:iln battle tanks 22,200 52,200 30,500 68,300 
Ullery mortar 13,700 46,500 24,100 64,000 
1tl·tank weaponsb 10,570 17,650 20,120 24,970 
~M 2,250 12,850 3,000 16, 150 
ilicopters (armed) 780 1,630 2,020 2,130 
ICV 4,200 25,800 8,000 34,400 
ind combat aircran 
1mbers 285 450 518 1,182 
tack 2,108 2,144 5,157 3,119 
erceptors/fighters 899 4,930 1,763 5,265 
rval forces 
'bmarlnes 196 231 238 301 
1rriers 16 2 23 4 
uisers/destroyers/frigates 358 224 400 309 
~phlbious 200 100 250 123 
.c 168 238 168 415 
rval air 
1mbers 38 250 38 390 
tack 379 1n 621 235 
erceptors/fighters 180 12 264 12 
;w (Includes helo.) 535 374 1, 179 544 
Urr:6: International Institute of Strategic Studies (1987) 
'fes: •For NATO includes most of Western Europe. For the Warsaw Pact, includes Soviet forces in 
1scow, Volga, Ural, and North and Trans-Caucasus Military Districts. 
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conventional forces in Europe. The cost of conventional weapons sig-
nificantly exceeds that of nuclear weapons, and attempts by the US and its 
European allies to reduce the gap with the Warsaw Pact will impose 
greater strains on alliance budgets. 
Factors influencing defence spending 
This section discusses more fully the factors mentioned in the introductory 
section as potential determinants of defence spending levels. These factors 
will be used to specify an empirical model of the demand for defence 
output. 
International events 
As might be expected both the Korean and Vietnam wars had a great 
impact on US defence spending, with the Korean war producing by far the 
stronger effect. According to Kahn (1982: 47): 
In June 1950, the United States Congress was engaged in a great debate 
over whether the defense budget should be $14, $15, or $16 billion. 
Along came the North Korean attack on South Korea. Congress quickly 
authorized $60 billion, an increase by a factor of four ... that authoriza-
tion alone represented an enormous military defeat for the Soviets. And 
yet it was almost three years before the funding was fully translated into 
increased defense expenditures and corresponding military power ... 
the fear of an impending Soviet attack on Western Europe - and the 
attack on South Korea - provided most of the motivation for the 300 per 
cent increase in new obligational authority. 
The Vietnam war produced a less dramatic example of an international 
event stimulating higher allocations to the US defence budget, as did the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Other examples of 
international events affecting defence spending were the activist policy that 
the Soviet Union pursued during the mid-1970s in the Middle East, Angola 
and Ethiopia. These actions certainly contributed to the upward trend in 
US expenditures that began about this time. 
Changing administrations - the electoral cycle 
The allocation and distribution of federal resources is an inherently 
political process. A major issue in assessing the United States defence 
budget centres around the control of the military budget by the executive 
branch. As Zuk and Woodbury (1986: 446) note, this is done in two ways. 
First, because a large portion of the defence budget, unlike social security 
spending, is not mandated by law, the President has wide latitude in 
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1rmulating the defence budget. The dollars involved in defence spending 
id the President's ability to influence such spending gain more impor-
1nce when it is realized that military spending requests from the chief 
tecutive are rarely reduced by Congress. 
Zuk and Woodbury found that in the years in which Congress cut the 
ital request, the average decrease was 2 per cent and never exceeded 5.3 
er cent. And although Congress is prone to make programmatic changes 
1 the defence spending categories of procurement, R & D, and military 
>nstruction, the fact remains that only twice in the last 30 years has 
:ongress altered executive budget requests by more than 10 per cent in the 
1ore important procurement and R & D categories. From this they 
[)nclude that the President's proposals are usually approved, and the large 
11ms spent for defence can indeed be used to influence macro-economic 
[)nditions. 
The best examples of incoming presidents changing defence spending in 
te post-war era are Kennedy and Reagan, both of whom opted for 
1creased spending. The 1960 Democratic Party platform specifically 
romised to recast the US military capability to provide forces and 
reapons of a diversity, balance and mobility .sufficient to deter both limited 
nd general aggressors. This concept eventually produced the Kennedy-
rkNamara strategic doctrine of 'flexible response', which in itself 
11creased defence costs (Schneider 1988: 56). The Reagan Administration 
• an even stronger example of a new leadership determined to increase 
iefence spending. 
In an analysis of US electoral cycles, Zuk and Woodbury (1986) found 
o support for an electoral-defence spending cycle in the post-war era. In 
uee of the nine presidential contests, defence spending decreased sub-
tantially rather than increased during the election year. Moreover, three 
1f the six times defence spending rose, the change was quite modest, 
anging from 2.1 per cent to 3.8 per cent. Also, the other three election 
lcreases occurred either during wartime or during periods when US-
JSSR relations were especially bad. In summary, Zuk and Woodbury 
rere unable to find a systematic relationship between defence spending 
nd presidential elections. 12 The implication of these results seems to be 
liat defence spending in the United States is probably not used on a 
ystematic basis by the President or Congress as a macro-economic policy 
11strument and, by extension, not used for the purpose of winning 
lections. 
1ublic opinion 
ri a democratic society electoral competition normally ensures that in 
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must rely on voter opinion. Perhaps the best example of the link between 
public opinion and defence expenditures concerns the so-called 'Vietnam 
Syndrome'. From 1971 to 1978 more Americans favoured cuts than 
favoured increases in defence spending. The percentage favouring increased 
spending then mounted very sharply until 1980, after which it again sharply 
declined. 
The factors that may have brought about the downward trend in support 
for defence spending in the 1980s are many and complex. Among the more 
important were probably the prolonged and serious recession of 1981-3, a 
perception that the Reagan Administration was pouring money into the 
Pentagon while cutting back on social programmes, and growing aware-
ness of the· federal budget deficit as a national concern (Schneider 1988: 
64). Whatever the reasons, by mid-1985, the American public was in 
favour of cutting defence spending ahead of a whole host of social 
programmes, usually by lopsided margins. 
As for the direct relationship between public opinion regarding defence 
spending (increase or decrease) and total authorized spending, spending 
began to recover in 1975 well before those favouring increases began to 
outnumber those favouring cuts. However, the plurality favouring more 
spending peaked in early 1980, about 5 years before total authorized 
allocations peaked. Indeed the Reagan Administration (and Congress) 
continued to increase total authorized allocations for about 3 years after 
the public shifted back to favouring less defence spending. One author 
concludes that the relationship between public opinion on defence and 
actual spending is fairly weak: 
spending increases usually occurred when the op1mon balance was 
positive; spending decreases usually occurred when the opinion balance 
was negative. But no closer connection has been found. Linkages 
between the public and defense decision makers clearly had much slack 
and there is little basis for portraying defense policies as responses to 
articulate public demands (Higgs 1988: 47). 
Congress 
Congress plays a significant role in determining defence spending. The 
executive branch essentially sets the general level of spending by its request 
to Congress, and the legislative branch normally either cuts or increases 
the amount requested and some sort of compromise emerges. Korb (1982) 
has analysed Congressional responses to executive branch proposals for 
defence spending, and has noted a sharp change following Vietnam. From 
the outbreak of the Korean War through 1968, the Pentagon enjoyed a 
special relationship with the Congress in that, compared to the non-
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equests were almost always treated favourably by the legislative branch. 
>efence cutbacks in this period averaged only 1.7 per cent whereas those 
n the non-defence areas were more than five times greater (9.2 per cent). 
However, beginning with the first budget presented to Congress after the 
let offensive (fiscal year 1970), the legislative branch completely reversed 
ts attitude toward defence and non-defence programmes. From fiscal year 
970 to fiscal year 1975, the Democrat-controlled legislature appropriated 
110re money than the Republican presidents sought in 4 of the 6 years. The 
otal impact of Congress in this period was to increase federal spending by 
1
.5 per cent. However, it achieved this by slashing a full 6 per cent from 
lefence requests and adding nearly 5 per cent to the non-defence portion 
1f the budget. 
'erceptions of the Soviet threat 
1te very notion of defence conjures up, at least by implication some sort of 
llreat. Clearly the only perceived serious threat to the United States is that 
1osed by the Soviet Union. Beginning in the early 1960s the Soviets 
mdertook a rapid expansion of military capabilities. If one excludes the 
ncremental costs of the war in Southeast Asia, by 1968 the Soviets had 
orged ahead of the United States in the amount of money allocated 
nnually to defence (Korb 1982: 52). Moreover, because the Pentagon was 
orced to expend a large percentage of its budget first for prosecuting the 
iar in Southeast Asia and then for paying the additional personnel costs 
aused by the changeover to the all-volunteer force, the Kremlin began to 
iutstrip the United States in outlays for a wide spectrum of military 
apabilities. 13 
This situation continued through the 1970s, so that by the end of that 
ecade the gravity of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union began 
J impress the American people and their leaders. The changing military 
able 2.7 US-USSR strategic nuclear warhead inventory, 196D-84 
us USSR 
Delivery Warheads Yiekl' Delivery Warheads Yiekl' 
9ar vehicles- vehicles-
iJ60 529 1,734 1,812 215 415 475 
Hi5 2,034 4,110 4,433 442 598 2,066 
170 2,255 5,074 4,213 1,891 2,047 6,915 
175 2,145 9,170 3,386 2,458 2,614 6,723 
180 2,040 9,668 3,265 2,645 7,451 4,766 
18.4 1,986 10,630 2,n1 2,728 9,146 5,170 
'JIXCB: Brada and Graves (1988) 
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balance between the two nations began to appear in quantifiable measures. 
For example, as Table 2. 7 shows, the US enjoyed strategic superiority to 
the USSR for many years. Butthis superiority was lost by the 1970s when 
the USSR achieved strategic parity, if not dominance. 
To deal with this situation the Carter Administration, which had planned 
to cut defence spending by $5-7bn, actually raised the fiscal year 1979 and 
1980 defence budgets by 3 per cent in real terms and pledged to maintain 
continued real increases of that magnitude for the foreseeable future. 
Congress, which had been hostile to absolute or relative increases in 
defence spending throughout 1969-78, ultimately appropriated the 3 per 
cent increase requested by the administration and urged the President to 
devote even more resources to areas like strategic nuclear forces and naval 
combatants. 
Arms control agreements 
It is impossible to assess the degree to which arms control agreements have 
affected United States military spending. As one observer has noted: 
When one considers such programs as the ABM, B-1, and Trident - all 
of which received considerable funding during the first SALT negotia-
tions - one begins to wonder if SALT 1 produced any economic savings 
(Blacker and Duffy 1984: 248). 
Here, probably the more significant factor reducing defence expenditures 
was the general spirit of detente that lasted for a period of time in the 1970s. 
It may be that the way arms control agreements affect spending is 
simply not easily observed. For example, the US and USSR are on the 
verge of a strategic arms agreement (ST ART) that would leave each nation 
with 6,000 warheads, about one-half of the current US arsenal. Although 
this agreement would have a minor direct effect on spending, it could have 
indirect effects. As an illustration, DOD could decide to reduce the 
number of warheads allocated to the Navy and increase the allocation of 
land-based missiles controlled by the Air Force, a change in force structure 
that would require fewer costly Trident submarines. Another possibility is 
that spending could rise if each side takes steps to better protect their 
remaining arsenals, such as via the SDI programme in the US. 
Inter-service rivalries 
Many Washington observers have noted that inter-service rivalries have 
tended to push defence spending upward. Ball (1980) contends that during 
the Eisenhower era, the Navy typically asked for more than twice as many 
submarines as the administration saw fit to authorize, and that in the early 
1960s, Air Force requests for Minuteman missiles were for about 1,000 
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1ore than the Defense Department would approve. He also states that the 
\.ir Force lobby in Congress succeeded in obtai·ning funds for the manned 
•omber from fiscal year 1962 to fiscal year 1966 that were over and above 
l1ose requested by the administration. 
Whereas this and other anecdotal evidence is suggestive, it is hardly 
onclusive evidence that inter-service rivalry has caused US military 
xpenditures to be higher than they otherwise would have been. Apart 
rom specific cases of one service or another pressing for particular 
•rogrammes to be included in the defence budget, a key manifestation of 
nter-service rivalries affecting military spending is the drive of each to 
1btain, preserve and maximize its share of the total. 
Schneider (1988) concludes that inter-service rivalries have tended to 
nake the defence budget larger than it otherwise would have been, and 
ended to maintain the shares of each service near their traditional levels. 
fowever, no comprehensive empirical test _of this hypothesis has been 
1ttempted. 
Moreover, there is little reason to expect this factor to have played an 
mportant role in defence spending levels as the relative service shares have 
1een stable over time. The Air Force received a larger share (average 35 
Jer cent) than the other services during most of the 1948-85 period, 
rollowed by the Navy (31.5 per cent), and the Army (26.7 per cent). The 
l\rmy's share increased during the land wars in Korea and Vietnam. 
l;inally, the Navy's share has gradually increased from about 30 per cent in 
he early 1970s to about 34 per cent in the last several years, due to the 
mildup to the 600-ship navy. 
11/iances and burden sharing 
!\ final factor to consider in explaining military expenditures is the manner 
in which US expenditures are affected by those of its major NATO allies. 
:-)Ison and Zeckhauser (1966) argued that in alliances the pure public good 
1ttribute of national defence and differences in member size combine to 
:reate free-riding behaviour by smaller alliance members. These theoreti-
:al arguments have added fuel to what has become a major policy 
:ontroversy - the question of continued US military support of South 
Korea, Japan and NATO. For example, estimates of the share of the US 
Jefence budget devoted to the defence of Western Europe ranges from 50 
o 64 per cent (Krauss 1986). 14 The combined wealth of the NATO 
nc:mber nations has prompted many analysts to argue that NATO-Europe 
;hould assume a larger share of the cost of its own defence. The US Senate 
1as. informally instituted a 'burden sharing initiative' and appointed a 
;pedal representative who will negotiate with allied nations to increase 
heir share of defence costs. 15 • 
It should be noted, however, that analysts have also pointed out that 
I 
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defence output is composed of different types of weapons systems, which 
vary in the degree of publicness. Consequently, some defence outlays may 
induce complementary behaviour by allies rather than the substitution 
effects envisioned by Olson and Zeckhauser. Murdoch and Sandler (1984) 
and Sandler (1988) indicate that burden sharing in the NATO alliance 
crucially depends on the ratio of private (country-specific) benefits to the 
total benefits derived from the alliance arsenal. The larger this ratio, the 
greater the degree to which allies' contributions will match efficient 
provision levels for defence expenditures. A high proportion of private 
benefits induces allies to pay for their own share of defence outlays rather 
than relying on other allies to provide security, because these benefits can 
be withdraw~ at will by the provider unless a payment is received. 
When, however, the arsenal provides benefits that are mostly public 
(alliance-wide) as in the case of nuclear deterrence, greater burdens are 
placed on the dominant allies with the largest economies. In the case of 
public benefits, a defence provider finds it difficult if not impossible, to 
exclude other allies from relying on the defence benefits derived from its 
arsenal. Those allies with the most at stake become the contributors. 
Sandler's work indicates that during most of the 1950s and into the 
1960s, the European NATO countries were able to free-ride on the US 
nuclear deterrence capability. Since the early 1970s, however, it appears 
that a decline in the role of nuclear deterrence and implementation of the 
'flexible response' doctrine as a viable defence strategy has shifted the 
burdens toward the European countries. Murdoch and Sandler's empirical 
results are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the flexible response 
doctrine has reduced free-riding through an induced complementarity 
among the jointly produced defence outputs. 
Empirical analysis 
Several previous studies have specified and estimated demand functions for 
military output. Most formal models of the demand for military output 
have employed an approach that involves maximizing a social utility 
function subject to a general budget constraint (Smith 1980; Murdoch and 
Sandler 1982; 1984). The Murdoch and Sandler studies yielded important 
insights by modelling NATO's decision structure as a Nash-Cournot 
process. None the less, this approach ignored the role of the internal 
political process in collective choices. Dudley and Montmarquette (1981) 
attempted to correct this omission by formulating an explicit collective 
choice model of defence spending. The median voter theorem was 
employed to derive military expenditure demand functions and to empiri-
cally estimate tax-price and income elasticities for defence. Their effort 
was only partially successful because many of the nations in their empirical 
sample either were non-democratic or based on proportional representation. 
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The median voter theorem postulates a single-dimensional issue space in 
.vhich each issue is decided by a direct vote of fully informed voters. These 
·equirements may appear restrictive especially because most political 
;ystems are representative rather than direct democracies. However, 
Downs (1957) has demonstrated that in a two-party system, electoral 
:ompetition between the parties produces essentially the same outcome as 
lhe median voter theorem. 
One key feature of the median voter model that may limit its application 
at the national level is the assumption (Borcherding and Deacon 1972) that 
governments supply output at the point where marginal cost equals 
demand and, in return, obtain a budget equal to the minimum necessary 
cost of producing the selected output level. Although this assumption may 
be reasonable for local governments, which ultimately are constrained by 
the mobility of residents, it is questionable for central governments. 
Perhaps most important, the median voter paradigm rules out autonomous 
behaviour by government decision-makers on output and price. 
With these weaknesses in mind, Gonzalez and Mehay (1987) analysed 
military spending utilizing a theoretical framework that stresses the ability 
of decision-makers to choose between alternative fiscal outcomes. The 
model integrates the role of bureaux in basic supply decisions and in the 
determination of defence output (Niskanen 1971; 1975). Gonzalez and 
Mehay argued that, in contrast with the median voter model, a bureau 
supply model appears to be more compatible with the expenditure 
determination process at the central government level. 
Because the appropriate conceptual collective choice paradigm for 
specifying a defence spending model is not settled, in this chapter the 
question is framed in terms of the budget level achieved by defence 
decision-makers. This approach is compatible with a Niskanen-type bureau 
supply model where decision-makers act to maximize budget size. Note 
that this maximand in the Niskanen model is equivalent to output 
maximization so long as the marginal benefit of output is positive. Bureaux 
are subject to the constraint that cost cannot exceed output. 16 
Defence decision-makers are hypothesized to adjust expenditures over 
time to bridge the gap between what decision-makers consider to be the 
optimal level of defence capability, and that which exists at any point in 
time. The optimal level of preparedness is assumed to be a function of 
events such as the Vietnam war and detente, and factors such as domestic 
economic constraints, NATO responses, the perceived Soviet threat, 
inter-service rivalries and perhaps the election cycle and/or whether a 
Republican or Democrat administration is in power. 
Obviously each of the factors discussed above makes a priori sense. 
However, whether or not it makes a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the pattern of US military expenditures is clearly 
aq empirical issue. A major problem lies in the fact that because of 
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deficiencies in the data, several of the factors are probably not capable of 
being empirically tested {public opinion, congressional attitudes, arms 
control agreements and inter-service rivalry). In this chapter an attempt is 
made to model factors such as the Soviet threat, domestic economic 
constraints, international events like Vietnam, and NATO burden sharing 
relationships. The purpose of the empirical analysis is not so much to test 
the implications of a particular theoretical model of government decision-
making as to assess the relative importance of the various demand factors 
already identified. 
The technique adopted here is to evaluate competing hypotheses 
concerning ~he relative importance of the factors already identified. 
Defence decision-making is assumed to be characterized by a partial 
adjustment process, which can be represented as follows: 
M, =a Mi+ (1- a)M,_1 {l) 
where M, is actual military spending in time t, Mi is the desired level, and 
a is the coefficient of adjustment. Thus, observed expenditures are a 
weighted average of the desired expenditures at t and the actual expenditures 
in the previous period. We further assume that M, is a linear function of the 
factors already mentioned: 
k 
Mi = Po + I:P; x~ + t, 
i=l 
{2) 
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) yields the partial adjustment 
model: 
M, = aP0 +a L p,X: + (1 - a) M,_1 +a&, (3) 
In specifying equation (3) for empirical estimation, it is assumed that 
domestic economic considerations and the Soviet threat constitute the 
most important determinants of desired military spending levels. The 
speed of adjustment a is assumed to be a constant. Thus, the primary 
model to be estimated is 
+ + + 
MX, = a + b1 MX,_1 + b2 REXP, + b3 RUEXP, + b4 UCPI, 
+ + (4) 
+ b5 REVD, + b6 DEF,_1 + b7 VIET+ e, 
where MX, is real US defence spending in year t ($ m), MX,_1 is US defence 
spending lagged one year, REXP, is expected Soviet defence spending, 
RUEXP, is unanticipated Soviet defence spending, UCPI, is unanticipated 
US inflation, REVD, is the deviation from the trend in federal revenue, 
DEF,_1 'is the federal deficit lagged one year, VIET is a dummy variable for 
the Vietnam War period, and e, is an error term. 
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The Soviet threat is proxied by the expected level of real Soviet military 
:xpenditures. The expected spending variable is .constructed by regressing 
he level of Soviet military expenditures each year on its value for the 
irevious year. This variable should have a positive effect on MX if Soviet 
pending levels are employed as indicators of Soviet military intentions by 
JS decision-makers and they are able to alter budget requests in response 
o the perceived threat. 
Changes in US domestic economic constraints are also assumed to 
nftuence the level of optimal (desired) spending levels by defence 
lecision-makers. Desired spending is further assumed to depend on the 
-ate of unanticipated inflation in the US, the federal budget deficit, and on 
he revenue side, deviations from the trend in real federal revenues. 
Inflation concerns are proxied by increases in unexpected inflation. 
Unanticipated inflation is constructed as the difference between actual.and 
expected inflation, where the latter is obtained by regressing the inflation 
rate each year on its value for the previous year. If inflation accelerates, it 
is assumed that budget-makers react by holding down discretionary 
expenditures, especially defence. Similarly, if the economy is growing 
more rapidly than projected, the growth of federal revenues will exceed 
projected levels and discretionary expenditures will tend to grow. The 
previous year's budget deficit should have an obvious constraining effect 
on defence spending. Note that since the economic variables, especially 
REVD, reflect the level and growth rate of the economy, GNP is not 
included as an explanatory variable in the specification. The basic model 
also includes a dummy variable (VIET) for the Vietnam War period (equal 
to 1 for 1967-72, 0 otherwise). 
It should be pointed out why some of the potential factors discussed in a 
previous section were omitted from the specification. The impact of inter-
service rivalry could have been measured by each service's share of total 
defence outlays. However, as these shares have been relatively stable over 
the period covered by the data, very little variation in the data would have 
been observed. Similarly, presidential or congressional elections could 
have been measured by the party in power, but it was unclear which 
political party has consistently influenced defence spending, and in which 
direction. 
The expected signs of the coefficients are indicated above the variables 
in equation ( 4). Data used for the estimation are for the 1965-85 period.17 
Because of serial correlation of the residuals, the model is estimated using 
the first-order autoregressive iterative (Cochrance-Orcutt) technique. 
Parameter estimates are presented in Table 2.8. 
In column 1 a basic model is estimated that includes as explanatory 
varlables only the Soviet threat, lagged US spending, and a dummy 
variable for the Vietnam War period. The results of the estimation are 
faiJ"ly robust; the coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically 
1 
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Table 2.8 Parameter estimates of spending model 
Variable Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) 
MX,., 0.723 0.740 0.935 0.916 
(4.31)• (8.29) (14.22) (14.22) 
REXP 0.642 0.844 0.361 0.295 
(2.88) (6.03) (5.21) (3.94) 
VIET 28,007 27,580 17,282 14,987 
(2.47) (5.12) (3.78) (2.79) 
UCPI -204,497 -247,085 -246,543 
(6.18) (7.66) (7.13) 
REVD 203.85 261.36 232.93 
(3.92) (5.50) (4.26) 
DEF1•1 -67.39 -91.91 -92.94 
(1.86) (2.74) (2.77) 





Constant -111,300 -159,505 -68,046 -48,071 
p 0.533 0.629 0.196 0.027 
R'adl 0.622 0.897 0.965 0.974 
Fstatistic 10.90 27.31 73.68 85.67 
DW' 2.86 2.15 2.82 2.56 
Notes: • t ratios in parentheses. 
b OW, Durbin-Watson statistic. 
significant. The adjusted R2 indicates that the basic model accounts for 
about 62 per cent of the variation over time in US spending. 
Column 2 in Table 2.8 introduces the effect of domestic economic 
constraints into the estimation. Again, in all cases the signs of the 
estimated coefficients are as expected and they are statistically significant. 
Moreover, this model explains about 90 per cent of the variation in defence 
spending. 
Column 3 introduces NATO members' spending into the model. The 
NATO variable, NA TODT, is measured as the deviation from the trend in 
total NATO spending (net of US spending), where the trend is established 
by first estimating a linear trend equation. Again, it is hypothesized that 
US defence budget-makers adjust the optimal spending levels based on 
European NATO spending levels. Although the coefficient of NATODT 
in column 3 is statistically significant, the positive sign indicates that 
unexpected increases in European NATO member spending tends to 
induce US decision-makers to increase, rather than lower, their own 
spending. This provides some evidence that the US does not free-ride on 
the NATO alliance. Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare these results 
to those of earlier studies that observed free-riding by the US (Murdoch 
and Sandler 1982; 1984) due to differences in theoretical and empirical 
specifications. 
Finally, in column 4 of Table 2.8 the impact of detente is included in the 
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stimation. DETENT is a dummy variable "equal to 1 for the period when 
old war tensions were relaxed in 1972-6. The.results in column 4 indicate 
hat the period of detente had the expected downward effect on US 
pending, although the coefficient is not significant. 
:onclusions 
JS defence expenditures are likely to level off or decline in real terms over 
.he next 5 years or so. The major factor driving the military build up in the 
~arly 1980s - the perceived Soviet threat - appears to be subsiding, or at 
east is not the burning political issue it was in the late 1970s. Even if it 
1Vere, fears of increased inflation, concern over budget deficits, and 
Jramm-Rudman budget-cutting would make any major increases 
~xtremely unlikely. This future period of retrenchment.confronts defence 
policy-makers with an unusually large number of challenges. 
It is possible that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act 
will require deep cuts in defence spending and painful trade-offs both 
between social and defence programmes, and across different types of 
defence programmes. For example, if military pay cuts are selected as one 
quick-fix method of reducing military outlays, force manning and readiness 
may suffer, as it did in the late 1970s when the military-to-civilian pay ratio 
fell dramatically. Reduced recruitment and retention may bring renewed 
calls for reinstituting the draft for first-term personnel, with all of the 
potential social disruptions. 
However, the probability of a serious fiscal crunch will probably be 
mitigated by the strong economic growth of the US economy. With 
continued economic growth the economy will continue to generate high 
growth rates of personal income and federal tax revenues, which should 
enable DOD to meet primary force structure objectives within the confines 
of Gramm-Rudman. Moreover, the impact of any cuts on national security 
will be lessened by the improvement in superpower relations and the 
apparent willingness of the Soviet leadership to reduce their military 
posture. 
The slowdown in Soviet economic growth provides a partial explanation 
for why the USSR has agreed to negotiate the INF treaty, to withdraw 
from Afghanistan, and appears willing to discuss conventional, as well as 
nuclear, arms reductions. The US defence buildup in the 1980s posed a 
serious policy dilemma for the Soviet leadership. If the Soviets had 
followed suit, the cost could have been further economic stagnation of the 
civilian economy, reduced capital formation, and even lower future 
gr,owth. This ultimately would reduce the ability of the economy to meet 
future military requirements. On the other hand, if the Soviets had not 
followed suit. thev mav have found themselves at a severe military 
l . 
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any military advantages that the US would otherwise have achieved 
without unduly raising defence spending requirements in the Soviet Union. 
Future US defence directions 
Future US defence strategies are, of course, difficult to predict and depend 
heavily on evolving international relations. The future international 
climate will depend in part on the policy changes currently underway in the 
Soviet Union. Some observers have concluded that the new policies of 
perestroika and glasnost, and the restructuring of the Soviet economy are 
signalling a.n era of benign Soviet foreign policies. Many observers, 
however, have argued that it is unlikely that the current reform movement 
will lead the Soviet Union to significantly reduce its military capabili~ies 
(Lee 1986; Zycher 1986). They point out that military strength is the only 
reason the USSR has achieved superpower status. Therefore, they 
conclude it is dangerous to believe that the poor performance of the Soviet 
economy will force the USSR to disarm. Unilateral or even bilateral 
disarmament would reduce the USSR to a second-rate world power, 
whereas the US still would remain a super ower. 
A second area of uncertainty in international relations is the growth of 
other potential superpowers. The US Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy (1988) argues that rapid economic growth in Japan, and the 
projected growth of China (following their own economic reforms) will 
confront strategic planners with a future world composed of as many as 
four, or more, major military powers. It should be added that this multi-
polar world will be further complicated by the likely emergence of an 
economically integrated Western Europe in the early 1990s, which may 
choose to pursue its own independent security goals. Clearly, the grand US 
defence strategy that has worked so well since the Second World War 
will need to be altered to incorporate a wider range of contingencies 
and international relationships. Strategic planning will require greater 
flexibility if the US is to attain a military posture sufficiently robust to deal 
with future superpower alignments. 
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he economics of defence spending 
'i 'The productivity paradox', Business Week, 6 June 1988, p. 100. 
7 OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, June 1988, Paris. 
B Business Week, 15 August 1988, p. 30. 
r) Business Week, 8 August 1988, p. 18. 
IJ DOD outlays include military pensions, which have become the fastest growing 
segment of the budget. Also, some defence-related purchases originate in 
government departments other than DOD. 
I The Economist, 16 July 1988, p. 24. 
2 Zuk and Woodbury feel that their results are consistent with those of Krell 
(1981), who found the irregular pattern of US expenditures to have been largely 
determined by two international factors - war and the state of relations with the 
Soviet Union. The picture is not this straightforward, however, because the 
war-defence spending relationship apparently varies by type of defence 
spending. . 
3 It should be noted that estimates of Soviet spending levels vary widely. Becker 
(1986) surveys the various methods of estimation. 
4 In 1986, the US maintained 250,000 military personnel in West Germany, 
75,000 in other parts of Europe, 43,000 in South Korea, and 48,000 in Japan 
(US Secretary of Defense, 1988). 
IS Navy Times, 25 July 1988, p. 15. See US General Accounting Office (1988) for a 
history and evaluation of defence burden sharing initiatives. 
16 See Gonzalez and Mehay (1987) for a detailed derivation of the model. 
17 Military spending data are in constant dollars and are derived from US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers, Washington, DC, various issues. Economic data are taken from the 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 
Washington, DC, various issues. 
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The political economy of military effort in 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
Daniel N. Nelson 
Introduction 
For the USSR and the six East European members of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization (WTO, or Warsaw Pact), the economics of defence spending 
were once largely moot. Soviet hegemony obviated choices that might have 
been made among East European states based upon their own economic 
considerations. Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Bulgaria acted as junior partners in the Warsaw Pact because 
their ruling regimes' political futures depended on it, economic consequences 
notwithstanding. Romania's behaviour, from 1964 distinctive within the 
alliance, nevertheless had substantial limits to the breadth or depth of its 
'independence'. 
In this chapter a full treatment of the complex political economy of 
a multi-state European communist system and its relationship with 
expenditures for defence is impossible. Nevertheless, it is important to 
underscore at the outset that the theme of choices and alternatives 
elaborated elsewhere in this book - the perennial guns-for-butter debate in 
Western competitive democracies - was less relevant to the Warsaw Pact 
during most of its first three decades (1955--85). During these decades, the 
defence policies of member states were inextricably interwoven within the 
political and economic hegemony of the USSR and the mutual depen-
dencies created by that regional dominance. 1 Romania was the exception 
to this generalization, but still remained within the Pact, and exercised 
choice only to limited degrees on specific issues (e.g. relations with Israel 
or China and arms control). Choices were made at the margins of foreign 
and defence policies, if at all, effecting modest changes in Soviet use of the 
WTO for its own security planning. 
In the era of Mikhail Gorbachev, this has changed and Eastern Europe 
and the USSR have become less bound to one another, and their develop-
ment and maintenance of military forces are now less intertwined. At 
least through the mid-1980s, however, politically and economically forced 
defence policies produced high levels of military effort by WTO member 
